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Disclaimer 
 
 
 This material is based upon work supported by the Midwest Technology 
Assistance Center for Small Public Water Systems (MTAC). MTAC was established 
October 1, 1998 to provide assistance to small public water systems throughout the 
Midwest via funding from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
under section 1420(f) of the 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act. MTAC is 
funded by the USEPA under Grant No. X829218-01. Any opinions, findings, and 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USEPA or MTAC. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
In response to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the Federal Department of Homeland 
Security required all water systems to perform a vulnerability assessment (VA) and submit it to 
U. S. EPA and prepare or update their emergency response plan (ERP). 
 
The VA process up to this point had been a self-assessment by the individual water systems.  A 
third party appraisal of the VA process was considered the most effective method to evaluate the 
implementation of the measures identified by the VA.  ERTC evaluated the VA and ERP process 
on the “Plant D” water system, which would be representative of small water distribution 
systems throughout the state.   
 
Three ERTC personnel performed the evaluation of the VA and ERP at “Plant D” (a distribution 
system) during December of 2005.  The evaluation was performed in three parts: initial visit; 
follow-up visit; and the system manager’s response to the two water system interruption 
scenarios.  To assess the VAs and ERPs at the water system, ERTC developed an evaluation 
method based upon protocol developed by the U.S. EPA, the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment (KDHE), and the National Rural Water Association (NRWA). Using a risk 
assessment method modified from the KDHE method, ERTC evaluated existing deterrents in the 
water system while at the same time determining which elements of the system are at greatest 
risk.  
 
The element presenting the highest risk to the continuing supply of safe and reliable water was 
the lack of an alternate electrical power supply.  The water system does not have a backup power 
supply to operate its pumps, chlorine generation and injection system, in its three pump houses.   
 
The water system manager was provided with two water system interruption scenarios to 
address.  The first scenario presents the manager with an incident of accidental contamination of 
the water system with agricultural chemicals.  The second scenario is an act of a terrorist 
introducing a biological contaminant into the water system. This was a cognitive exercise 
designed to make the manager dust-off his ERP and use it to complete the incident report forms 
and worksheets provided to them by ERTC.  The second benefit of working through the exercise 
was that the manager would realize the value of updating and upgrading his ERP and VA. 
 
ERTC made twelve recommendations to the water system, the most important being the 
acquisition of an alternative power source to operate the pump houses. 
 
It is our conclusion that “Plant D” is a very well managed water distribution system.  It has a 
Cross Connection Control Program (CCCP) that is up to date and well documented. The water 
system has done a very good job of using its limited manpower and resources to help create and 
upgrade deterrents to intentional and/or unintentional situations that may lead to contamination 
of the public water supply.   
 
The VA and ERP prepared by the water system were adequate and met all the requirements.  
However, during the evaluation of the VA, the ERTC staff found a few inadequacies.  It was also 
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evident that few, if any, of the security issues identified in the VA have been addressed.  It is our 
opinion that after the original VA was prepared and forwarded to U.S. EPA, it was then placed 
into a file cabinet and not looked at again until a day or two before the ERTC visit.  This is 
typical human behavior, for the manager to use all of his work time addressing the daily 
responsibilities of running the water system, while placing the VA out-of-site and out-of-mind.   
To alleviate the potential problem with the out-of-site-out-of-mind VA, it is recommended that 
some type of periodic update of the VA be performed by all of the subject water systems. 
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Section 1 
Introduction, Need and Methodology 
 
 
1.1   Introduction and Need 
In response to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the Federal Department of Homeland 
Security required water systems to perform a vulnerability assessment (VA) and prepare or 
update their emergency response plan (ERP).   The VA was required to be completed and 
submitted to U. S. Environmental Protection Agency by June of 2004, and the ERPs were to 
have been certified as updated to incorporate findings of the VA by the end of the same year. 
 
The need to evaluate the effectiveness of the VA and the implementation of the security 
measures was realized in discussions between the Midwest Technical Assistance Center 
(MTAC) at the Illinois State Water Survey in Champaign, Illinois and the Environmental 
Resources Training Center (ERTC) at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.  The 
evaluations would be targeted at the small water systems serving populations of 10,000 and less. 
 
The VA process up to this point had been a self-assessment by the individual water systems.  A 
third party appraisal of the VA process was deemed the most effective method to evaluate the 
implementation of the measures identified by the VA.  ERTC entered into an agreement with 
MTAC to evaluate the VA and ERP process in four water systems that would be representative 
of small water systems throughout the state.   
 
 
1.2   Personnel 
The evaluation team consisted of three of the ERTC staff members.  The staff performing the 
evaluations was: 
 
Barb Woods holds an Illinois Class A Water Operator License and has 18 years of experience in 
water plant operations.  Kim Bateman holds a class C/D water operator license and an IEPA 
Cross connection Control Inspector license.  He also has over 20 years of experience in water 
and wastewater operations.  Paul Shetley holds an Illinois Class C/D Water Operator License, 
and has over 20 years of water quality experience including six years as manager of a water 
distribution system. 
 
 
1.3   Methodology 
It is not practical or possible to evaluate every water system in the state of Illinois.  Therefore, 
MTAC and ERTC agreed to evaluate one water system from each of the following four 
categories:  (1) groundwater treatment, (2) surface water treatment, (3) distribution system, and 
(4) a system that treats and buys water wholesale.  The water system evaluated in this document 
is a distribution system, hereafter referred to as “Plant D”. 
 
To be able to evaluate the water systems, ERTC compiled and developed an evaluation protocol 
that was applicable to each type of system.  The protocol was used to compare and contrast the 
VA prepared by the water system to the security issues found during the ERTC visits to the 
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facility.  The security issues evaluated would be each water system’s physical assets (buildings, 
vehicles, tanks, pumps, water mains, valves, and hydrants), IT assets (computer systems and 
SCADA systems), and cross connection controls.   
 
The protocol utilized to evaluate the water systems was based upon the U.S. EPA Emergency 
Response Protocol Toolbox, the Simplified Vulnerability Assessment Tool for Drinking Water 
designed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) and the National Rural 
Water Association (NRWA) Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Drinking 
Water Systems.  The ERTC staff employed a three-step procedure to evaluate each water system, 
which consisted of three one-half day, visits to the system.   
 
Day 1 Initial site visit to the water system was used to explain the evaluation procedures  to the 
manager of the system.  The VA prepared by the system was reviewed and its contents 
discussed with the manager.  System manager was interviewed regarding security 
systems and cross connection control programs.  The system manager was also asked to 
complete a questionnaire evaluating the VA and security measures at his facility. 
 
Day 2 After review of the data collected during the initial site visit, the ERTC personnel 
prepared additional questions tailored to the specific security issues observed.  The ERTC 
survey team returned to the water system to ask the manager specific questions related to 
his water system. 
 
Day 3 The manager of each system was asked to address two “water system interruption 
 scenarios” that were prepared by the ERTC staff.  The manager completed the 
 questionnaires associated with each of the two scenarios.   
 
During each site visit, the ERTC evaluation team reviewed the potential for intentional and 
unintentional contamination or interruption of the water supply.  Intentional contamination of the 
water supply would include: 
 
a. Vandalism 
b. Terrorism 
c. Sabotage 
      
Unintentional contamination or interruption of the water supply would include: 
 
a.         Water main break 
b.       Cross connection event 
c.       Drop in water pressure 
d.       Malfunction of chlorine feed system 
e.       Contamination of the source of water 
f.       Tornadoes 
g.       Floods 
h.       Earthquakes 
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1.4   Risk Assessment Methodology 
The risk evaluation method presented below was modified from the KDHE Simplified 
Vulnerability Assessment Tool for Drinking Water.  This method was chosen because it places a 
numeric value to the risk of each element of the water system.   
 
Risk: 
The individual components of risk ( R ), the probability of an asset being at risk ( P ), the 
consequences to the supply of water if the threat to a asset is carried out ( C ), and the 
effectiveness of any deterrents that would mitigate the threat ( E ) are expressed in the equation 
below.  The risk is simply the product of the components P, C, and E: 
R = P x C x E 
 
It should be emphasized that R represents relative risk.  The goal of risk management should be 
to balance risk across the water system’s highest-ranking asset.  By modifying the deterrent for 
each asset at risk, a greater effectiveness of control is asserted toward each system’s protection of 
potable water quality.  
 
Factors for P, E, and C 
 
Probability of this asset being at risk (P)  Effectiveness of Deterrents (E) 
Low        1     Highly Effective 1  
  to                  to 
High     5     Ineffective  5 
 
Consequence of Action (C) 
Normal supply of safe water – all demands met                1 
Adequate supply of safe water – all emergency demands met  2 
Inadequate supply of safe water – parts of the system without water 3 
No supply of safe water – only contaminated water available for fire 
fighting and sanitary needs       4 
No water available – system shut down         5 
 
 
Example 1 Master Meter   
 
 
 
 
 Explanation for this asset: 
 P = because of this asset’s location, it was considered a low probability 
 C = occurrence at this asset would eliminate water service to many customers 
 E = well lighted, high traffic area, with security camera 
 R = 3 is considered a relatively low risk 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 1  R = 3 N/A   
Comments: 
By convenience store 
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Example 2 Storage Tanks  
 
 
 
 
 
 Explanation for this asset: 
 P = because of this assets remote location, it was considered a high probability 
 C = occurrence at this asset would eliminate service to many customers 
 E = no security measures, no effective deterrents in place 
 R = 75 is considered a very high risk 
   
 
1.5   Summary of Distribution System “Plant D” 
Plant D is a distribution system that purchases its water from a large wholesale supplier.  It has 
been supplying water to its customers for approximately 30 years, and gains from 40 to 50 new 
customers a year.  The manager of the water system completed the VA and submitted it to the 
EPA in June of 2004, as required by the regulations.  He also updated the system’s ERP and 
submitted the certificate of completion to EPA in the fall of 2004.   A SCADA (supervisor 
control and data acquisition) system was installed in 2003 at two pump houses and one 
controlling water tower.  The water system has continued to expand its SCADA system, with 
plans to have the all of the system monitored within the next few years.  A summary of the Plant 
D system is provided below. 
 
1. Two 500,000 gallon ground storage vessels 
2. Four 750 gpm high service pumps 
3. Two 250 gpm booster pumps 
4. Four elevated storage towers 
5. 100 miles of distribution main ranging from 2 to 12 inches 
6. 2500 customers 
7. One office building 
8. One maintenance building 
9. Seven employees 
10. Chlorine solution generated onsite using a MIOX system 
11. Two potential interconnects 
a. Interconnect #A 
b. Interconnect #B  
c. Two vaults 
12.       One Hot Box, backflow prevention assembly enclosure (customer owned) 
13.       Fire Hydrants 
14.       Meters 
15.       Computer System  
      16.       SCADA monitoring 50% of system 
 
P = 5  C = 3 E = 5  R = 75  N/A 
Comments: 
Elevated Tank 
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Section 2 
Findings of Field Evaluations 
 
 
2.1  Results of Interview with System Manager (Day #1) 
 
For the following nineteen items, ERTC assigned a value from 1 to 5 for the factors P,C, 
and E.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = probability of occurrence at this asset 
C = consequences to the supply of water if the threat to this asset is carried out 
E = the effectiveness of any deterrents that would mitigate the threat 
R = individual components of risk 
N/A = does not apply, put a X 
 
 
1. Master Meter #1_________________________  
 
 
 
 
2. Master Meter #2_____________________ 
 
 
 
 
3. Buildings____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
4. Chemicals and Storage________________________ 
 
 
 
 
5. Storage Tanks________________________________  
 
 
 
 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 1  R = 3  N/A 
P = 1  C = 2 E = 3  R = 6  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
(Elevated) 
P = 1  C = 3 E = 1  R = 3  N/A 
(Ground) 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 1  R = 3 N/A
Comments: 
By convenience store 
Comments: 
Rural setting 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Elevated and Ground 
Note:  An explanation of the factors used in completing the risk 
equations is presented again for the convenience of the reader. 
Modified from: Simplified Vulnerability Assessment Tool for 
Drinking Water (KDHE) as explained in Section 1. 
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6. Primary Power_______________________________ 
 
 
 
7. Pumps_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Pipes_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Valves______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Hydrants, flush______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
11. Other vulnerable points_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Computers__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
P = 3 C = 3 E = 5  R = 45  N/A 
P = 3 C = 3 E = 4  R = 36  N/A 
Above ground: 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 1  R = 3  N/A 
Below ground: 
P = 3 C = 3 E = 1  R = 9  N/A 
Above ground: 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 1  R = 3  N/A 
Below ground: 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 3  R = 9  N/A 
P = 3 C = 2 E = 4  R = 24  N/A 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 2  R = 2  N/A 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Above and below 
ground 
Comments: 
Above and below 
ground 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
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13. Files_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Transportation, work vehicles_________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
15. Telephones_________________________________ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
16. Cell phones________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
17. Radio_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
18. SCADA system______________________________ 
 
  
 
  
19. Schools_____________________________________ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 2  R = 2  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 3  R = 3  N/A 
P = 1 C =1  E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = 1  C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = 1 C = 3 E = 1  R = 3  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
Comments: 
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2.2  Results of Questionnaire Completed by System Manager (Day #1) 
      (Questionnaire based upon Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small 
      Water Systems, NRWA) 
 
1. Is access to the critical components of the water system ( i.e., a part of the 
 physical infrastructure of the system that is essential for water flow and/or  water 
 quality ) restricted to authorized personnel only. 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Are facilities fenced, including well houses and pump pits, and are locked  where 
 appropriate. 
 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
3. Are your doors, windows, and other points of entry such as tank and roof  hatches 
and vents kept closed and locked. 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
“contract work overseen by 
  administrators” 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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4. Is there external lighting around critical components of your water system. 
 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Are warning signs (tampering, unauthorized access, etc.) posted on all critical 
components of your water system.  For example, well houses and storage tanks.  
 
 Yes [      ] No [  x   ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Do you patrol and inspect your source intake, buildings, storage tanks, 
 equipment, and other critical components. 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
  
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Is the area around the critical components of your water system free of objects 
that may be used for breaking and entering? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
“Critical areas are lighted “ 
Action Needed/ Taken 
Out of site, out of mind 
Why advertise to public 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Critical components are free 
of objects 
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8. Are the entry points to your water system easily seen? 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
  
 
 
 
 
9. Do you have an alarm system that will detect unauthorized entry or 
 attempted entry at critical components? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Do you have a key control and accountability policy for all locked water system 
facilities? 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
  
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Are your wellheads sealed properly? 
 
 Yes [      ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [  x  ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
All except tank #3, it is setting 
in a wooded area that is somewhat 
secluded 
Action Needed/Taken 
50% SCADA monitored 
office and maintenance shed 
audible alarm, 
neighborhood calls into sheriff 
Action Needed/Taken 
Personnel only 
Action Needed/Taken 
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12. Are well vents and caps screened and securely attached? 
 
 Yes [      ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [  x  ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Are observation/test and abandoned wells properly secured to prevent 
 tampering? 
  
 Yes [      ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [  x  ] 
 
 
 
14. Is your surface water source secured with fences or gates.  Do water system 
 personnel visit the source? 
 
 Yes [      ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [  x  ] 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Are deliveries of chemical and other supplies made in the presence of water 
 system personnel? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken  
Action Needed/Taken 
Call before delivery is made 
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16. Have you discussed with your supplier(s) procedures to ensure the security of 
 their products? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Are chemicals, particularly those that are potentially hazardous or  flammable, 
properly stored in a secure area? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
18. Do you monitor raw and treated water so that you can detect changes in water 
quality? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
19. Are tank ladders, access hatches, and entry points secured? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Salt purchase only 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
On top of required sampling 
Other measures are completed 
as needed 
Action Needed/Taken 
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20. Are vents and overflow pipes properly protected with screens and/or grates? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Can you isolate the storage tank from the rest of the system? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Do you control the use of all hydrants and valves? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Does your system monitor for, and maintain, positive pressure? 
  
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
 2-10 
24. Are your personnel issued photo-identification? 
  
 Yes [     ] No [  x  ] 
  
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
25. When terminating employment, do you require employees to turn in photo 
 IDs, keys, access codes, and other security-related items? 
 
 Yes [ x  ] No [     ] 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
26. Do you use uniforms and vehicles with your water system prominently 
 displayed? 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ] 
  
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
27. Have water system personnel been advised to report security vulnerability 
 concerns and to report suspicious activity. 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ]      
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
28. Are vehicles locked and secured at all times. 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ]       
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Looking into possibility of 
Requiring photos 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
When necessary 
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29. Are maps, records, and other information stored in a secure location. 
 
 Yes [  x  ] No [      ]       
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. Are copies of records, maps, and other sensitive information labeled 
 confidential, and are all copies controlled and returned to the water system. 
       
  
 Yes [ x  ] No [      ] 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31. Is there information on the Web that can be used to disrupt your system or  help 
induce a contaminant into your water system? 
            
 Yes [     ] No [  x  ]  
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
 2-12 
 
2.3 Results of Questionnaire Completed by the System Manager (Day #1) 
(Questions developed by ERTC) 
 
 
 
1. Do all of your distribution system meters have backflow prevention protection? 
 Yes [  x   ] No     [      ]   
Dual checks [  x   ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
2. Are your three (4) water storage vessels inspected periodically for: 
Water quality  [  x   ] 
Proper operation [  x   ]   
Vandalism  [  x   ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
3. Do you have some form of validation process for entering the water storage 
vessels? 
 Yes [     ] No     [  x  ] 
        
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Of your 2,500 water customers, how would they be categorized. 
 a. high hazard a. __ “a few”_________ 
 b. low hazard b. __”mostly”________ 
c. what factors are used to determine a difference between high hazard and 
low hazard 
      
N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
In addition, every 3-5 years 
engineers inspect tanks for paint, 
damage, and repair needed 
Action Needed/Taken 
Personnel notifies office 
when working in storage tanks 
Action Needed/Taken 
By reviewing CCR, Also knowing 
what the water will be used for 
 2-13 
5. Are materials located at your maintenance building protected from: 
 a. vandalism [  x   ] 
 b. theft  [  x   ]   
 c. weather [  x   ] 
 d. terrorism [  x   ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
6. How would you classify your water distribution system operators and employees?  
 1. Class A  [  x  ]   
2. Class B  [      ]  
3. Class C/D  [  x  ] 
4. Office workers [  x  ] 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
7. Do you incorporate the process of seasonal stuffers with your billing? 
 Yes [     ] No     [  x   ] 
  
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. What type of backflow prevention do you require on lawn sprinkler systems? 
 RPZ [  x  ] 
 Other [      ]     
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Equipment inside shed 
Pipe outside is not 
Action Needed/Taken 
Maintenance personnel are 
Certified operators 
Exceptions ; laborer 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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9. Does the District do its own water main taps? 
 Yes [  x   ] No     [      ] 
       
 N/A [       ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Does fire hydrant flushing incorporate other departments or people? 
a. fire department [  x   ] 
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Are flush hydrants kept locked up? 
 Yes [     ] No     [  x  ]  
       
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Is your computer software protected from outside intruders? 
Yes [  x   ] No     [      ] 
       
 N/A [       ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
 2-15 
13. Are passwords and virus protection periodically upgraded? 
Yes [  x   ] No     [      ]  
        
 N/A [       ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Is there computer software for the backflow prevention program? 
 Yes [     ] No     [  x   ] 
           
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Are all truck drivers that deliver chemicals to your plant properly checked out for 
correct identification, to include contents of truck? 
 Yes [ x   ] No     [     ] 
          
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Are all residential above ground potable water sources protected and locked. 
Example: Farmer has a “Hot Box” enclosure for his RPZ backflow prevention 
assembly? 
Yes [ x   ] No     [     ]       
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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2.4 Results of in-depth discussion with System Manager (Day 2) Part 1 
 
 
The checklist items 1-7 presented below include distribution system assets taken from the 
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Water Systems (NRWA). 
 
 
 
1. Are facilities that house backflow prevention assemblies locked or resistant 
 to tampering? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
  
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Are warning signs (tampering, unauthorized access, etc.) posted on all critical 
components of your water system. (For example, Hot Box /backflow prevention 
outside enclosure)? 
 Yes [     ] No     [  x  ] 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Do you patrol and inspect your outside backflow prevention assembly 
 enclosures? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
We believe that advertising to the 
general public where our critical 
components are is not wise. 
 
Out of site, out of mind. 
Action Needed/Taken 
 
Daily 
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4. Is the area around the critical components of your outside backflow 
 prevention assembly enclosure free of objects that may be used for breaking 
 and entering? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
5. Are the entry points to your outside backflow prevention assembly 
 easily seen?  Can someone hide close to your outside backflow prevention 
 enclosure and not be seen? 
 Yes [  x   ] No     [  x   ] 
 
 N/A [       ] 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
6. Do you have a video camera or alarm system that will detect unauthorized 
 entry or attempted entry at your outside backflow prevention enclosures? 
 Yes [  x   ] No     [  x   ] 
  
 N/A [       ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Do you have a neighborhood watch program for your water system. 
 Yes [  x   ] No     [     ] 
 
 N/A [       ] 
 
  
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Both, 
One is in an urban setting 
One is in a rural setting 
Action Needed/Taken 
Both, 
Entry alarm through the SCADA 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
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2.5 Results of in-depth discussion with System Manager (Day 2) Part #2 
 
The checklist items 1-21 were developed by ERTC from the Illinois Environmental 
Protection Agency (IEPA) Title 35 regulations.  
 
1. Do you have a Cross Connection Control Program? 
 Yes [  x   ] No     [     ]      
 
 N/A [       ] 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Do you have a Cross Connection Control Program ordinance approved by the 
IEPA?   
Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
3. What type of program do you have? 
a. isolation  [  x   ]  
b. containment  [  x   ] 
 c. total protection [       ] 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Is your distribution system current with its requirement of biannual system 
surveying? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ]  
           
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken  
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Cisterns and wells isolated from 
Potable water system 
 
Dual check valves required on 
every service
Action Needed/Taken 
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5. How is the process of question number (4) carried out? 
 Phone           [ x   ]  
 Mail           [ x   ] 
 Personal Visit       [      ] 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
6. Is a physical inspection required if the received survey is not completely filled 
out? 
 Yes     [      ] No     [  x   ]          
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. If a physical inspection is required, who is required to do the inspection? 
  a. water operator                 [     ] 
 b. plumber   [     ]  
 c. water operator/CCCDI [     ] 
 d. plumber/CCCDI  [     ] 
 
 
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Does your ordinance require a physical test of all testable backflow prevention 
assemblies upon installation and annually there after? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Ongoing, as people move in or new 
service line is installed a customer 
survey is conducted and put on file  
Action Needed/Taken 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
IDPH, Plumbing inspector 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
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9. Do you require all backflow prevention testers (CCCDI) to be listed with your 
distribution department before work is done? 
 Yes [     ] No     [  x   ]  
      
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Does your program have a policy requiring disconnection of the service if the 
backflow prevention assembly is not annually tested? 
 Yes [ x   ] No     [     ] 
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Does your program have a policy that also requires a fee for reconnection of the 
service? 
 Yes [ x   ] No     [     ]  
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Does your Cross Connection Control Program have a set procedure for all  new 
connections to the distribution system or change of ownership? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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13. Does your program take into account other sources of water that might be 
 introduced during a fire situation? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Does your program take into account that rural water system residents often have 
private well systems? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
          
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Does your program take into account that water system customers may have lawn 
irrigation systems? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
             
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Do you require any person who will be working in your distribution system 
 to be acknowledged or permitted? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
            
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Licensed plumber on 
Permit and/or onsite 
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17. Does your Cross Connection Control program interact with other distribution 
system programs? 
 a. valve location and exercise   Yes     [     ] No    [ x   ] 
 b. hydrant flushing, swabbing/pigging  Yes     [     ]     No    [  x  ] 
 
     
 N/A [     ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. In case of a loss of pressure or contamination, are your operators trained in proper 
sampling techniques and location. 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
      
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. Is proper notification of service connection customers completely understood by 
your distribution system employees? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
       
 
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Does your distribution system ERP take into account all measures needed? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
    
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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21. Do you facilitate real time exercises regarding distribution system  interruption or 
pressure loss due to intentional or unintentional situations? 
 Yes [  x  ] No     [     ] 
       
 N/A [      ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action Needed/Taken 
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2.6 Results of in-depth discussion with System Manager (Day 2) Part 3 
 
 
The risk evaluation method was modified from the KDHE Simplified Vulnerability 
Assessment Tool for Drinking Water as explained in Section 1.   
 
For the following 22 items, ERTC assigned a value from 1 to 5 for the factors P,C, and E.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = probability of occurrence at this asset 
C = consequences to the supply of water if the threat to this asset is carried out 
E = the effectiveness of any deterrents that would mitigate the threat 
R = individual components of risk 
N/A = does not apply, put a X 
 
1. Private wells   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Lawn irrigation systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Outside yard hydrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A    
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Note:  An explanation of the factors used in completing the 
risk equations is presented again for the convenience of the 
reader. 
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4. Outside personal fire hydrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Fire trucks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Internal Program Conflicts 
 a. distribution system hydrant flushing 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 b. collections system line flushing 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 c. cleaning out collection system vac. trucks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = 3 C = 3 E = 3  R = 27  N/A 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action  Needed/Taken 
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7. Auxiliary water system 
 a. bulk water station 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Residential home water softener 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Sewer rodding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Filling swimming pool---winter chemicals, stagnate water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = 5 C = 1 E = 1  R = 5  N/A 
P = 4 C = 1  E = 1  R = 4  N/A 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = 5 C = 1 E = 1  R = 5  N/A 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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11. Feeding chlorine at plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Feeding other types of plant chemicals, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Air gaps, are they installed correctly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Atmospheric Vacuum Breaker (AVB), are they installed correctly 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Yes, they are installed correctly 
Action Needed/Taken 
Yes, they are installed correctly 
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15. Hydrant program,  
 a. are RPZ required and tested before hydrant is used 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b. are hydrants designated/permitted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Hot Boxes, outside enclosures for backflow prevention assemblies 
 a. are the kept locked 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Any pits or vaults, assemblies have test cocks or relief valves which can create a 
potential point of entry for contaminants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
P = 1 C = 4 E = 1  R = 4  N/A 
Action Needed/Taken 
Master Meter 
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18. Any outside backflow prevention assembly enclosures without freeze 
 protection  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
a. any outside backflow prevention assemblies with landscape 
 or poor drainage issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. RPZ assembly and its relationship to a drain 
 a. flooding due to undersized drain, potential contamination 
 
  
 
 b. alarm system for backflow prevention assembly discharge 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
c. Is flooding alarm connected to a SCADA, caller ID 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
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20. Fertilizer Plant Connections to Water 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Water main breaks, unaccounted for water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Fire or Flush hydrants hit by vehicles 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = C = E =  R =  N/A  x 
P = 1 C = 1 E = 1  R = 1  N/A 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
Action Needed/Taken 
3-1 
 
Section 3 
Distribution System Interruption Scenarios 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
To further test the effectiveness of the water system’s ERP, its manager was asked to address two 
distribution system interruption scenarios.  The first scenario presents the manager with an 
incident of accidental contamination of the water system with agricultural chemicals.  The second 
scenario is an act of a terrorist introducing a biological contaminant into the water system. This 
was a cognitive exercise designed to make the manager dust-off his ERP and use it to complete the 
incident report forms and worksheets provided to them by ERTC.  The second benefit of working 
through the exercise was that the manager would realize the value of updating and upgrading his 
ERP and VA.   
 
For each scenario, the manager was asked to complete two forms and a worksheet taken from the 
USEPA Emergency Response Toolbox, Planning For and Responding to Drinking Water 
Contamination Threats and Incidents.  The forms and worksheets completed by the water system 
manager for each scenario, are listed below along with their corresponding section numbers where 
they can be found in the EPA document. 
 
Security Incident Report Form, Section 2.4 of USEPA Emergency Response Toolbox 
 
Site Characterization Report Form, Section 3.6 of USEPA Emergency Response Toolbox 
 
Public Health Response Action Worksheet, Section 5.4 of USEPA Emergency Response Toolbox 
 
 
The organization of Section 3 of this report is as follows: 
 
Section 3.2 Presentation of Scenario #1 and response by the water system personnel 
Section 3.2.1 Security Incident Report Form for Scenario #1 completed by the system manager 
Section 3.2.2 Site Characterization Report Form for Scenario #1 completed by the system 
manager 
Section 3.2.3 Public Health Response Action Worksheet for Scenario #1 completed by the 
system manager 
Section 3.3 Presentation of Scenario #2 and response by the water system personnel 
Section 3.3.1 Security Incident Report Form for Scenario #2 completed by the system manager 
Section 3.3.2 Site Characterization Report Form for Scenario #2 completed by the system 
manager 
Section 3.3.3 Public Health Response Action Worksheet for Scenario #2 completed by the 
system manager 
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3.2 Distribution System Interruption Scenario #1 
 
 
Condition: 
Unintentional contamination of a portion of the distribution system. 
(To complete this task, use attached report forms and action worksheet)    
 
Scenario: 
 
A storm occurs and power to your high service pumps is lost. 
At the same time that power is lost, a car hits a flushing hydrant. 
 
Due to storage in your water tower, system pressure is maintained for short period.  As time 
passes, system pressure drops below 20 psi. 
While this occurs, chemicals from a fertilizer plant backflow into the distribution system.  
Chemicals in the system are:     
a. alachlor  
b. atrazine  
 
Using your ERP, explain the steps needed to restore power, fix the flush hydrant, remove the 
chemicals from your distribution system and notify the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C = 3 P = 5 E = 5  R= 75  N/A 
Action Needed / Taken (Completed by Water System Manager ) 
 
1. System wide boil order issued by way of radio, TV, hand delivery, phone,  doorknockers, 
and by word of mouth 
2. Assuming there is a generator, begin emergency operating plan, to get the high  service 
pumps up and running to re-pressurize the distribution system. 
3. Dispatch the maintenance crew for repairs to the damaged flush hydrant 
4. Issue a Do Not Drink order by way of media, word of mouth, phone, doorknockers. 
5. Contact fertilizer plant to verify any sudden loss of product and if so what product is 
 missing.  Get MSDS sheets for the possible missing product. 
6. Once missing product is verified by fertilizer plant, notify IEPA of situation. 
7. Try to isolate the effected area, either by shutting down valves in the distribution  system 
or by flushing water in a one-way direction. 
8. Contact bottling plants for drinking water source for those affected. 
9. Begin sampling upstream and down stream for chemical analysis from the area  calling 
in the unusual odor. 
10. Once samples are normal and upon the approval of the IEPA, remove the DO NOT 
 Drink order. 
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 3.2.1 Completed Security Incident Report Form for Scenario #1 
  (Transcribed from forms completed by the System Operator) 
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3.2.2 Site Characterization Report Form for Scenario #1 
(Transcribed from forms completed by the System Operator) 
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3.2.3 Public Heath Response Action Worksheet for Scenario #1 
(Transcribed from forms completed by the System Operator) 
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3.3 Distribution System Interruption Scenario #2 
 
Condition: 
Intentional contamination of a portion of the distribution system. 
(To complete this task, use attached report forms and action worksheet)  
 
Scenario: 
 
A saboteur rents a farmhouse. 
The individual then removes the dual check from the house meter yoke.  The individual then 
takes two, 55-gallon barrels of biological material, and using two small PD pumps, 
injects the contents into your distribution system. 
 
Biological contaminants injected into the system are: 
a. pseudomonas bacteria 
b. fecal coliform bacteria 
 
He then leaves the farmhouse.   
Several days later, a number of people on the same line become ill.   
 
Using your ERP, explain what needs to be done in order to reduce the possibility of more 
people getting ill.  How other distribution service customers will be notified.  Finally, explain 
what needs to be done to reconcile this problem. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
C = 2 P = 3 E = 3  R = 18  N/A 
C = 4 P = 5 E = 5  R = 100 N/A 
Action Needed / Taken (Completed by Water System Manager) 
 
1. Increase chlorine levels to at least 2.0 mg/l free chlorine residual in the distribution 
 system. 
2. Notify residences of the possible contamination and issue a Do Not Drink order until further 
notice.  Contact residences by means of doorknockers, house-to-house  notification, word 
of mouth, and the media.  ( When contacting the media, give a press  release stating 
public input as to any suspicious activities noted in what area, and  possible dates; this might 
bring the person(s) out in the open or at least make them move  out of the area). 
3. Contact IEPA, IDPH; contact local lab for use of sampling, around the clock  monitoring, 
Sheriffs Office, and Water Bottling plants ( for drinking water to be made  available to 
residences affected ). 
4. Sampling at affected homes including upstream and down stream 
5. Begin heavy flushing to ensure a positive route for contaminants to exit the distribution 
 system. 
6. Continue monitoring samples every 24 hours until no positive are shown for at least two 
 consecutive samples 24 hours apart. 
7. Upon IEPA approval, remove the Do Not Drink order and resume normal operation. 
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3.3.1  Completed Security Incident Report Form for Scenario #2 
(Transcribed from forms completed by the System Operator) 
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3.3.2  Site Characterization Report Form for Scenario #2 
(Transcribed from forms completed by the System Operator) 
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3.3.3  Public Heath Response Action Worksheet for Scenario #2 
(Transcribed from forms completed by the System Operator) 
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Section 4 
 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, and CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1   Summary 
 
Three ERTC personnel performed the evaluation of the VA and ERP at “Plant D” during 
December of 2005.  The evaluation was performed in three parts: initial visit; follow-up visit; 
and the system manager’s response to the two water system interruption scenarios.  To assess the 
VAs and ERPs at the water system, ERTC developed an evaluation method based upon protocol 
developed by the U.S. EPA, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), and 
the National Rural Water Association (NRWA). Using a risk assessment method modified from 
the KDHE method, allowed ERTC to evaluate existing deterrents in the water system while at 
the same time determining which elements of the system are at greatest risk.  
 
All areas of the system were evaluated for risk.  Using the evaluation results, ERTC ranked 
specific elements of the system with the highest risk, based upon their numeric risk value.  The 
water system management should make it the highest priority to work toward reducing the risk to 
the element with the high-risk values.  The elements of the water system with the highest risk 
values are ranked and presented below: 
  
   1. Electrical Power   (45)  
   2. Fire Truck Connection to Hydrants (27)  
   3. Flush Hydrants   (24) 
    
ERTC also used general questions from the Section 1 of the NRWA Vulnerability Self-
Assessment for Small Water Systems to further review the areas of greatest concern related to 
protection of the potable water supply.  Areas in the distribution system that had already been 
protected in a positive manner were also noted.  Listed below are the portions of the system that 
should be considered for upgrade. 
 
1. The water system does not have a backup power supply to operate any of its three pump 
houses creating a risk value of 45.  This value is relatively high because all equipment in 
the pump houses is powered by electricity.  Electrical powered equipment at each pump 
house includes the pumps, chlorine generation system, and chlorination injection pumps, 
which are necessary for the safe and proper operation of the water system. 
 
2. Allowing fire trucks free access to fire hydrants creates a risk value of 27.  The value is 
relatively high due to the potential risks associated with the possibility of chemical (fire 
retardants and foaming agents) and biological (bacteria) contaminants being present in 
fire truck tanks.  There is also a potential for the fire truck pumps to exceed the capacity 
of the water flow in the distribution mains, resulting in a vacuum that could create a 
backflow condition with the potential for contamination of the potable water supply.  
This risk is an inherent problem with the use of potable water in firefighting. 
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3. Flush hydrants are located at water main termination points creates a risk value of 24.  
The value is relatively high because of the remote locations of the hydrants. 
 
4. Fifty percent of the “Plant D” system is monitored by SCADA.  The system manager 
stated that as his budget allows he will be continuing to upgrade and expand his SCADA 
system.  The ERTC staff agrees that any additional on-line monitoring through the 
SCADA system would be beneficial, especially when considering the size of the system. 
 
5. The management of the water system believes that the posting of warning signs would 
attract vandals and curiosity seekers to who might try to enter the secure zones.  The 
ERTC staff believes that the signage could be a deterrent if posted in the proper places. 
 
6. The management of the system recognizes the need for all personnel working in their 
system to be easily identified.  They plan to remedy this situation in the near future by 
issuing photo IDs. 
 
7. The management of “Plant D” recognizes that certain matters related to the water 
distribution system are proprietary.  There are no plans to supply information on a 
website that would compromise the security of the potable water system. 
 
8. The pipe storage yard is not secured by any fence or other deterrent.  The pipe storage 
yard is accessible to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. 
 
9. Dual check valves on all the meter installations are a very strong deterrent to the potential 
for either intentional or unintentional contamination of the distribution system.  The 
installation of the dual check valves at all meter settings was performed by the water 
system over ten years ago.  This action is evident of a pro-active and forward thinking 
management. 
 
10. Periodic inspections of the water towers and ground storage tanks should be scheduled as 
a significant deterrent to intentional/unintentional threat to the water quality of the 
system. 
 
11. High hazard areas in the distribution system should always take a high priority by way of 
periodic review.  It only takes a small amount of certain chemicals to create a very big 
problem in the potable water system. 
 
12. Seasonal bill stuffers in the water bills should be considered as a method of informing the 
customer of possible unintentional system contamination through cross connection 
violations.  Spring is an opportune time of year, since people are active out of doors 
filling swimming pools and using hand held chemical spray bottles. 
 
13. Computer Software might be considered for  your annual backflow prevention assembly 
testing requirements.  These programs are now capable of doing a variety of other duties 
such as scheduling water quality monitoring, hydrant flushing, flow testing, and valve 
exercising. 
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4.2   Water System Interruption Scenarios 
 
The water system manager was provided with two water system interruption scenarios to 
address.  The first scenario presents the manager with an incident of accidental contamination of 
the water system with agricultural chemicals.  The second scenario is an act of a terrorist 
introducing a biological contaminant into the water system. This was a cognitive exercise 
designed to make the manager dust-off his ERP and use it to complete the incident report forms 
and worksheets provided to them by ERTC.  The second benefit of working through the exercise 
was that the manager would realize the value of updating and upgrading his ERP and VA 
 
In an interview subsequent to the completion of the system interruption scenario incident report 
forms and worksheets, he stated that exercise was very worthwhile and made him realize the 
value of maintaining a current VA and ERP. 
 
 
4.3   Recommendations to the System Manager 
 
The following recommendations have been compiled by the ERTC evaluation staff to aid the 
water system manager in upgrading his facility to avoid possible contamination of the potable 
water supply.  The review committee also noted elements of the water system that had already 
been protected.   The recommendations are based on the evaluation of the VA prepared by the 
water system using the NRWA Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guidelines.  The Kansas 
Department of Health and Environment (Bureau of Water) Simplified Vulnerability Assessment 
Tool for Drinking Water was used as a tool to evaluate the VA. 
 
1. Backup Power Supply: 
The installation of a backup power supply is recommended to ensure an uninterrupted 
supply of safe, reliable drinking water. 
 
2. Fire Trucks: 
Allowing fire trucks free access to fire hydrants is a relatively high risk.  The potential 
risks are associated with the possibility of fire retardants and contaminated water being 
present in fire truck tanks.  There is also a potential for the fire truck pumps to exceed the 
capacity of the water flow in the distribution mains, resulting in a vacuum that could 
create a backflow condition with the potential for contamination of the potable water 
supply.  It is recommended that water system personnel be present when fire trucks are 
using water from hydrants. 
   
3. Warning Signs: 
Warning and Do Not Enter signs should be posted at secure areas such as pumphouses 
and storage tanks. 
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4. System Visibility:   
Any element of the water system located in a rural setting is at a relatively high risk.  If 
possible, brush and trees should be removed from the site to make it more visible to the 
neighbors, local traffic, and law enforcement officials. 
 
5. Pipe Storage Yard Security: 
Securing the pipe storage yard with a fence that would restrict access to authorized 
personnel is recommended.  There is a high potential for the pipe in currently unsecured 
storage area to be tampered with, causing damage and contamination of the water supply. 
 
 
6. Intruder Alert: 
“Plant D” is not manned and monitored on 24 hour a day basis, providing an opportunity 
for intruders during off-duty hours.  The three pump houses have intruder alarms that 
have not been connected to the SCADA system.  It is recommended that the intruder 
alarms be connected to the SCADA system and the automatic dialer to alert the on-call 
staff when unauthorized personnel enter the buildings. 
 
7. SCADA System Upgrade: 
It is highly recommended that the water system continue with its planned upgrade and 
expansion of its SCADA system.  The utilization of a SCADA system is the most 
efficient method to monitor a large water distribution system. 
 
8. Cross Connection Control Program: 
The water system uses isolation and containment (dual check valves on all the meter 
installations) as part of their Cross Connection Control Program.  This is a very reliable 
method of providing redundant protection of the potable water system.  It is 
recommended that the water system continue with its current CCC program 
 
9. Back Flow Device Inspection: 
A physical inspection of back flow prevention devices such as RPZs and dual check 
valves should be required by the water system. 
 
10. Back Flow Device Inspection 
A licensed plumber who is also a certified Cross Connection Control Device Inspector 
(CCCDI) should perform all inspections of backflow devices. 
 
11. List of Registered Contractors: 
It is recommended that all people who will be working in the distribution system register 
with the water system in some manner.  A list of CCCDI professionals should be kept at 
the office and provided to water customers who are in need of their services.  
   
12. Lawn Irrigation System: 
The water system should continue to ensure that all customers with a lawn irrigation 
system install and maintain the required back flow device such as RPZs and dual check 
valves. 
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4.4   Conclusions 
 
It is our conclusion that “Plant D” is a very well managed water distribution system.  It has a 
Cross Connection Control Program (CCCP) that is up to date and well documented.   The ERTC 
evaluation team has made a few recommendations to improve the CCCP.   
 
The water system has done a very good job of using its limited manpower and resources to help 
create and upgrade deterrents to intentional and/or unintentional situations that may lead to 
contamination of the public water supply.  However, ERTC recommends a few upgrades to the 
security system along with continuing the planned upgrade of the SCADA system.  Also strongly 
recommended is the installation of a backup power supply to operate the pumps during the 
inevitable electrical outage. 
 
The VA and ERP prepared by the water system were adequate and met all the requirements.  
However, there were a few discrepancies found between the VA prepared by the water system 
and the one prepared by ERTC evaluation staff.  It was evident that few, if any, of the security 
issues identified in the VA have been addressed.  It is our belief that after the original VA was 
prepared and forwarded to U.S. EPA, a copy was placed into a file cabinet and not looked at 
again until a day or two before the ERTC visit.  This is typical human behavior, for the manager 
who uses all of his work time addressing the daily responsibilities of running the water system, 
while placing the VA out-of-site and out-of-mind.   To alleviate the problem of the out-of-site-
out-of-mind VA, it is recommended that all of the subject water systems perform some type of 
periodic update of the VA. 
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